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TRUTH-TELLING, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND THE 
ETHICS OF GRADING 
Gary Chartier* 
As every teacher knows, grades matter to students. It is 
not altogether surprising that students sometimes bring 
concerns about their grades to court. Student challenges to 
institutional grading decisions have consistently been 
unsuccessful. 1 Courts have characteristically been unwilling to 
entertain such claims both because of their perceived trivialitl 
and because judges lack "the authority ... [and] the expertise to 
prescribe academic standards ... "3 On the other hand, "[n]o 
teacher has a fundamental right to hand in random or skewed 
grades .... "4 An educational institution has a legally recognized 
interest "in ensuring that its students receive a fair grade,"5 
and it is difficult to see why students might not be thought in 
principle to have a similar interest. Fairness issues arise with 
particular force when they concern, not subjective grading 
decisions made by instructors about individual student 
exercises, but rather general policies adopted by instructors 
and institutions. It would be unreasonable for a judge to 
assume under ordinary circumstances that she could improve 
on a teacher's judgment regarding the merits of an essay 
prepared for an English class. However, it might be easier for 
'* Assistant Professor of Business Ethics and Law, La Sierra University. PhD, 
University of Cambridge, 1991; JD, University of California at Los Angeles, 2001. I am 
grateful to Alexander Lian, Craig Kinzer, and Linn Tonstad for their characteristically 
thoughtful, perceptive, and critical observations on earlier versions of this article; to 
Elissa Kido for the chance to discuss the issues with which it is concerned during its 
development; to Annette Bryson, Eva Pascal, and Vittorio Trionfi for their willingness 
to review it; and to Carole Pateman for welcome opportunities for dialob'Ue and 
exchange. 
1. See e.g., Dilworth u. Dallas Community College Dist., 81 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 
1996); Attia u. Keller, 703 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Rayman u. Alvord Indep. School 
Dist., 6:~9 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1981). 
2. Raymon, 639 F.2d 257. 
3. Axelrod u. Phillips Acad., 46 F. Supp. 2d 72, 82 (D. Mass. 1999). 
4. Wozniak u. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001). 
5. Keen u. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1992) 
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the judge to assess the appropriateness of a policy calling for a 
reduction in the grade of any student who has, for instance, 
consumed alcohol; "[l]ess judicial deference, although still a 
considerable amount, is due those 'academic' decisions 
concerning academic and pedagogical policies of the university 
as to which reasonable educators can and do differ."6 In 1983, 
the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the claim that "the practice 
of reducing grades for nonacademic disciplinary reasons was 
constitutionally unreasonable and impermissible."7 However, 
other judges have not viewed this practice so kindly. "The final 
grade constitutes a record that purports to measure academic 
attainment," wrote a dissenting judge in the 1976 Illinois case 
of Knight v. Board of Education. 8 "[P]rospective employers as 
well as institutions of higher learning concern themselves with 
true academic achievement,"9 he observed, thus implying that 
grades are expected to serve as sources of information about 
academic performance rather than moral character. Similarly 
a federal district court concluded, in Smith v. School City of 
Hobart, that: 
[f]or college entrance and other purposes. . . [a 
substantial grade reduction for nonacademic reasons] 
would result in a clear misrepresentation of the 
student's scholastic achievement. Misrepresentation of 
achievement is equally improper and, we think, illegal 
whether the achievement is misrepresented by 
upgrading or by downgrading, if either is done for 
reasons that are irrelevant to the achievement being 
graded. For example, one would hardly deem acceptable 
an upgrading in a mathematics course for achievement 
on the playing field. 10 
On this basis, the court found that a "rule that calls for a grade 
reduction to discipline nonacademic conduct is illegal, and null 
and void."11 
While courts may, in general, continue to decline to hear 
6. Thomas A. Schweitzer, Academic Challenge Cases: Should Judicial Review 
Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students, 41 Am. U.L. Rev. (1993). 
7. New Braunfels Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Armke, 658 S.W.2d. 330, 331 (Tex. App. 1983) 
8. Knight v. Bd. of Educ., 348 N.E.2d 299, 305 (Ill. App. 1976). According to the 
Knight majority, a policy that precluded instructor discretion might "justify court 
intervention." 
9. !d. at 303. 
10. Smith v. Sch. City of Hobart, 811 F.Supp. 391,397-98 (1993). 
11. !d. at 399. 
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grading-related cases, and while there are surely good reasons 
for them to refuse to do so, legal disputes over academic 
evaluation will undoubtedly continue.12 A variety of legal 
theories support the conclusion that judicial assessment of 
some educational decisions is appropriate. 13 The law of contract 
has provided perhaps the firmest basis for students' claims. 14 A 
plausible contractual argument can be made that "[a] 
registered student has a legally protected interest in his college 
education,"15 and that when she enrolls, "a student ... expects 
that the school [at which she registers] will treat her fairly," 
which means, among other things, that she will not be 
subjected to "arbitrary grading."16 
The number of cases in which courts ought to entertain 
claims about academic evaluations are few, but normative 
questions about grading policies are frequent and unavoidable. 
Lawyers and judges may only rarely need to think critically 
and reflectively about the basis for grading policies; 
instructors, institutions, and students need to do so far more 
often. My goal here is not to determine what legal issues 
related to grading deserve consideration by the courts, but 
rather to articulate a normative framework that might 
reasonably guide assessments of the reasonableness of grading 
policies. My central contention is that an instructor has an 
obligation to grade accurately, to give to each student a grade 
that reflects the student's competence with respect to the 
subject matter of the course rather than any other factor. She 
should do so in accordance with what I call the principle of 
academic exclusivity (PAE), which requires that, as far as 
possible, all nonacademic factors be excluded from 
consideration when instructors determine grades. 17 In this 
12. See Jayme L. Butcher, Comment, MIT v. Yoo: Revocation of Academic Degrees 
for Nonacademic Reasons, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 749 (2001); Curtis J. Berger & 
Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student, 
99 Colum. L. Rev. 289 (1999); Dina Lalla, Student Challenges to Grade and Academic 
Dismissals: Are They Losing Battles?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 577 (1992). 
13. See Berger, supra n. 11, at 291 nn. 4-6 for a range of alternatives. 
14. !d. at 291-292. Berger and Berger are concerned with discipline rather than 
grading and might well not endorse the conclusions for which I argue in this article. 
15. !d. at 291. 
16. Id. at 318. 
17. The PAE embodies (at least some of) what Gregory F. Weis calls "the 
conventional view of grading." See Gregory F. Weis, Grading, 18 Teaching Philos. 3 
(1995). The "conventional view," for instance, "takes no account of what the student has 
had to do, of how hard the student has had to work." !d. at 10. It also "ignores the 
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essay, I elaborate and defend this principle, explaining that it 
is rooted in two simple obligations: first, a duty to tell the 
truth, and second, to respect the incommensurability of subject-
matter competence. I suggest reasons we ought to be 
suspicious of two alternative positions, which I label academic 
consequentialism and academic retributivism. And I argue 
that the PAE renders a number of common grading practices 
inappropriate because these practices take into account factors 
other than students' subject-matter competence (SMC). 18 These 
factors, I suggest, are relevant to the broader goals of 
education, and it is entirely appropriate that institutions 
evaluate students' performance with respect to many, perhaps 
all, of them. Student behaviors and character traits unrelated 
to SMC are certainly the business of educational institutions. 
However, any institutional evaluation of student performance 
that does not directly facilitate the estimation of SMC should 
not influence students' grades. Grades should reflect SMC 
alone. 
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF ACADEMIC EXCLUSIVITY 
The principle of academic exclusivity, the theory that 
grades should reflect only a student's SMC, follows from the 
duty to (a) tell the truth and (b) respect the 
incommensurability of SMC and a variety of other factors that 
sometimes influence students' grades. 
A. The PAE and Truth-Telling 
There is a general obligation to avoid deception-the 
intentional creation or encouragement of false beliefs in 
others. 19 The obligation to avoid deception to tell the truth 
classroom experience itself as a factor in a student's grade," and thus implicitly 
precludes taking attendance and participation into account. !d. My argument in this 
article may be seen, in part, as an attempt to formalize this view and spell out its 
implications. 
18. See the detailed discussion of this concept, infra. Randall R. Curren, Coercion 
and the Ethics of Grading and Testing, 45 Educ. Theory 425 (1995), uses language that 
suggests the appropriateness of the expression "subject-matter competence," but I do 
not believe he ever employs this expression himself. He says, for instance, that a 
"student's act of signing up for. . . [aj course could be understood to entail an 
admission of subject-specific and level-specific noncompetence." !d. at 435. 
19. Perhaps the standard contemporary philosophical analysis of lying is Sissela 
Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (Pantheon Books 1978). On "lying 
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reflects the value of personal autonomy-avoiding deception is 
a way of permitting each person to make up her own mind 
about possible evaluations or courses of action. It also fosters 
trust and community between people. Given this obligation, 
instructors must give grades that accurately reflect students' 
abilities in the subject matter taught. 
A grade is accurate to the extent that it permits someone to 
estimate the extent of a student's knowledge and skills in a 
given area. It is inaccurate to the extent that it leads someone 
to believe that she knows more or less than she does or that she 
can do more or less than she can. A good grade is not justified 
by a student's hard work; a poor grade is not justified by a 
student's sloth.20 More generally, a grade is not warranted by a 
judgment regarding a student's moral character, her 
helpfulness or respectfulness in class, or anything apart from 
her SMC.21 
Grades appear in general to offer academic rather than 
personal information. 22 Giving a grade in a particular course is 
and cunning. . las] forms of violence," see Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks For An Ethics 
195-204 (David Pellauer trans., U. of Chicago Press 1992). According to Sartre, lying 
represents the objectification and subjugation of the other. When I lie, I assert my 
authority over the other; and once I have conceded that I can lie, I imply that I am her 
or his master even if I do not exercise my imagined privilege. See also, Bernard Gert, 
Morality: A New Justification oft he Moral Rules 126-27 (rev. ed. of The Moral Rules 2d 
Torchbook ed., Oxford U. Press 1988); Leonard Nelson, System of Ethics 151-55 
(Norbert Guterman trans., Yale U. Press 1956); Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 54-78 
(lfarv. U. Press 1978); Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (U. of Chic. Press 1977); 
Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (U. of Chi. Press 1978); and T.M. Scanlon, What 
We Owe To Each Other (Belknap Press ofHarv. U. Press 1998). 
20. I regretfully disagree--on this issue-with "luck egalitarianism" as described 
and, on a qualified basis, defended by Francis Schrag, From Here to Equality: Grading 
Policies for Egalitarians, 51 Educ. Theory 63 (2001). For the luck egalitarian, because 
talent is a product of luck, we should minimize the effects of talent on social rewards. 
"lllf a student who has produced a paper with enormous effort receives a higher grade 
than a student who has produced a paper with little effort, this is just even when the 
second paper is higher in equality than the first ... ?" !d. at 70. According to Schrag, 
the luck egalitarian will emphasize that it is important to distinguish "grading the 
paper" from "grading the student." !d. at 70. But (and Schrag appears to be sensitive 
to this concern) we are interested in the paper precisely because we are interested in 
the student. A transcript reader cares about a student's grade in a given class because 
she wants to know something about the student's SMC, not because she's interested in 
how much effort a student has expended. 
21. As James Terwilliger, Assigning Grades-Philosophical Issues and Practical 
Recommendations, 10 J. of Research & Dev. in Educ. 21, 22 (1977), observes, a grade is 
not a reflection of "the amount ... (ofl 'effort' expended, the student's work habits, 
attitude, character traits (honesty, dependability, etc.) nor personality traits (cheerful, 
cooperative, etc.)'' 
22. Steven M. Cahn, Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia 107 n. 4 (Rowman & 
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a communicative act that provides prospective employers and 
educational institutions to which the student may apply with 
information regarding the student's competence in the 
particular subject matter of the course. 23 This understanding of 
what a grade is supposed to do follows from the role grades 
actually play in our society and the impersonal and generally 
inflexible character of the processes by which they are 
ordinarily interpreted. A human resources specialist or a 
graduate school admissions committee chair reviewing a 
student's transcript will likely understand a grade appearing 
on the transcript as primarily an index of the student's 
d . -l' 24 aca em1c per1ormance. 
The fact that transcript readers know that nonacademic 
factors may influence grades is often used to legitimize an 
instructor's decision to base a grade on factors other than SMC. 
Arguably, an instructor need not deceive most transcript 
readers if she allows such factors to play a limited role in 
determining a grade. 25 But there is still good reason for 
educators to avoid basing grades on nonacademic factors in the 
interest of accurate communication. Transcripts based solely 
Littlefield 1986), plausibly argues that "[t]hose who believe it important to recognize 
formally a student's level of effort or improvement should favor awarding 
supplementary grades for these special purposes rather than seeking to distort the 
recognized meaning of grades, thereby undermining their ordinary uses." 
23. See Knight, 348 N.E.2d 299 at 302; Smith, 811 F. Supp. 391 at 397~398; 
Schrag, supra n. 20, at 68~69, 72; Kenneth A. Strike & Jonas F. Soltis, The Ethics of 
Teaching 25 (Teachers C. Press 1985); Cahn, supra n. 20, at 107 n 4. As these 
examples suggest, the available empirical evidence regarding the assumptions people 
make about the meanings of grades is largely anecdotal. One more rigorous empirical 
inquiry adds somewhat to our understanding of the "consequential validity" of grades-
see generally Patricia A. Bigham Baron, presentation, Consequential Validity for High 
School Grades: What is the Meaning of Grades for Senders and Receivers (Am. Educ. 
Research Assn., New Orleans, La., Apr. 24~28, 2000) ERIC 445051. For the idea of 
consequential validity, see generally Samuel J. Messick, Validity, in Educational 
Measurement 13, 13~103 (Robert L. Linn, 3d ed., Macmillan Publg. Co. 1989). 
24. Schrag plausibly identifies as a desideratum "of any ethical grading policy" 
the requirement that grades "not convey deceptive information to those who receive 
them." He explains: "Grades typically send signals to a variety of audiences in addition 
to the students themselves: prospective employers, college or graduate schools' 
admissions committees, and parents include the most important. Most readers of 
transcripts are likely to interpret grades and transcripts in fairly predictable ways. 
When, for example, a college admissions committee sees high school transcripts 
recording Jack as having earned a Bin world history and Jason an A in the same class, 
committee members will infer that the quality of Jason's work was superior to Jack's." 
Schrag, supra n. 20, at 68~69. 
25. See Baron, supra n. 23, at 31~32. 
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on academic performance are already difficult to interpret.26 
Transcript readers generally lack evidence regarding the 
particular nonacademic factors at play in determining a 
particular grade or the weight given to any of these factors. 27 
And there appears to be no consensus among the diverse 
groups of people who rely on the information contained in 
transcripts regarding the weights they expect instructors will 
give-or believe instructors should give-to nonacademic 
factors when determining grades. The lack of a generally 
agreed-upon set of factors other than SMC that may contribute 
to the determination of grades clearly adds to the difficulties 
already associated with transcript interpretation.28 
Assumptions about the appropriate use of nonacademic factors 
in grading decisions are unsystematic and variable; those who 
do not share an instructor's or institution's judgments about 
the ways in which nonacademic factors should influence grades 
will have difficulty disregarding the influence of these factors 
when interpreting grades. 
26. Craig Kinzer plausibly suggests that, in an ideal world, a transcript would 
therefore include the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation for each course, 
teacher, and department to which it refers, for a period from the year before to the year 
after the one in which any course to which it refers was taken. As he notes, this would, 
regrettably, be too much information to be contained conveniently in a conventional 
transcript. Of course, web-based delivery of academic information might make 
providing data like these possible. According to Steven Cahn, " ... at a number of 
colleges, ... transcripts now include not only a student's course grade, but also the 
average grade of all students in the course." Cahn, supra n. 22, at 31. 
27. Suppose a student, Alex, receives an Fin a chemistry class because he may be 
responsible for an explosion in a chemistry lab. "Course grades ... are normally based 
on knowledge of subject matter. Anyone who sees Alex's transcript will conclude that 
he failed to learn chemistry, not that he is being punished." Strike & Soltis, supra n.23, 
at 25 
28. See Baron, supra n. 23, at 13-14, 21, 28. Parents, high school students, high 
school teachers, high school guidance counselors, and college admissions officers "are in 
reasonable agreement about the meaning of grades. Furthermore, when these groups 
look at a set of grades on a transcript and consider college aptitude, there is a lot of 
similarity across groups." /d. at 27. However, it is possible that college admissions 
officers "seem to read effort and improvement into grades and ... think these ought to 
count .... " /d. at 28. Though admissions officers are evidently prepared to assume 
that nonacademic factors influence grades, they seem to overestimate the impact of 
these factors on grading decisions and they lack information that would help them 
correct their somewhat inaccurate assumptions. 
Baron's study provides no information regarding the behavior or assumptions 
of college and university teachers, graduate school admissions officers, or employers of 
any sort; I am inclined to hypothesize that the perceived and intended influence of 
nonacademic factors declines at the baccalaureate and post-baccalaureate levels, and 
that employers are less inclined than admissions officers to assume or prefer that 
f.,'Tades reflect the influence of such nonacademic factors. 
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An instructor assigning a grade that does not reflect a 
student's SMC may not intend to deceive or to convey an 
inaccurate message to others; she may do so believing that 
transcript readers may understand the grade as she intends it: 
a response to something other than the student's SMC. At 
minimum, however, even if she does not intend to deceive, she 
must understand the risk that she will be misunderstood but 
be prepared to accept that risk because of some other good she 
seeks to achieve by assigning an inaccurate grade. However, 
the risk she is taking is great and the potential injury to the 
student and to transcript readers is considerable. An 
application of the "Golden Rule" test-would she be prepared 
for anyone else to suffer a comparable harm under similar 
circumstances because of the operation of a general principle 
permitting a choice like hers? Would she be prepared to suffer 
similar harm herself?29-might well lead her to doubt that her 
action is justified. 
Telling the truth when assigning grades means, at the very 
best, reducing the influence of nonacademic factors to a 
mm1mum. An instructor can reduce the risk of misleading 
transcript readers even further by declining to base grades on 
nonacademic factors at all. Even though some transcript 
readers may expect grades to be based on nonacademic factors, 
the odds of confused communication between instructors and 
transcript readers are arguably lowest when instructors base 
grades exclusively on SMC. 
B. The PAE and Incommensurability 
Some transcript readers may tolerate, or even welcome, 
instructors' willingness to consider nonacademic factors when 
determining grades. Taking such factors into account, even if 
doing so has the potential to increase confusion or 
misunderstanding is not always deceptive. However, there is a 
further reason to base grades solely on SMC: academic and 
nonacademic factors are incommensurable. They are 
sufficiently different that it makes no sense to measure them 
on the same scale. There is nothing wrong with evaluating a 
student's character-moral or otherwise-and communicating 
29. On applying the Golden Rule test, see e.g. John Finnis, Commensuration and 
Public Reason, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason 215, 
227-228 (Ruth Changed., Harv. U. Press 1997). 
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the results of this evaluation to others; doing so may actually 
be quite helpful to prospective employers and to other academic 
institutions. However, an evaluation of a student's character is 
not the same thing as an evaluation of her SMC. It is no more 
meaningful to collapse the two than it would be to add a 
student's height to her shoe size.30 
Recognizing the incommensurability of SMC and character 
or moral conduct is no different than acknowledging that SMC 
is not the same thing as a student's friendliness, good looks, or 
willingness to offer money or sexual favors for a better grade. 
One reason we as a society object to grades that are extorted in 
return for money or sex is because we recognize the coercive 
implications of such trades. Just as importantly, we also 
object to such actions because we believe that money, sex, 
charm, and an agreeable temper aren't the same thing as, and 
can't be combined with or collapsed into, SMC. These 
objections are different in nature, and fairness demands that 
they be evaluated differently. Someone who believes that it is 
inappropriate to give a student a good grade because she is 
friendly on the view that friendliness is not the same thing as 
SMC is logically committed to the view that it is also 
inappropriate to give a student a good grade because she has 
performed an act of tremendous bravery on a class trip, or 
anywhere else. Taking incommensurability seriously means 
keeping evaluations of everything other than SMC distinct 
from grades. 
C. Subject-matter Competence 
Following the principle of academic exclusivity (PAE) 
requires that grades reflect SMC. Educational institutions are 
rightly concerned with all sorts of things other than SMC, and 
30. On incommensurability, see e.g. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and 
Practical Reasoning (Ruth Changed., Harv. U. Press 1997); Elizabeth Anderson, Value 
in Ethics and Economics (Harv. U. Press 1993); Nola J. Heidlebaugh, Judgment, 
Rhetoric, and the Problem of Incommensurability: Recalling Practical Wisdom (U. of 
S.C. Press 2001); ,John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 95-97, 110-118, 
131-132 (Oxford U. Press 1980). 
An objector might suggest that scores on different kinds of exercises-essay and 
multiple-choice examinations, say-are also incommensurable. And it is certainly true 
that different kinds of exercises require students to exhibit somewhat different 
cognitive skills. However, while commensuration of results from disparate exercises 
need not be unfair, since all such exercises have in common the purpose of facilitating 
the predicting SMC. 
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they can and should find a range of mechanisms designed to 
express their concerns. The PAE simply dictates that 
nonacademic concerns not be expressed using grades. 
A student possesses SMC at a given level with respect to 
the content of a Calculus I course, for instance, if she 
understands the concepts explored in the course at the relevant 
level and has mastered the skills the course is designed to help 
her acquire at that level. Her actual academic performance is 
not an infallible measure of her SMC. Performance on some 
exercises has no tendency to tell us about SMC. On occasion, 
even if exercises have been designed to provide useful 
information about SMC, an instructor may possess other 
evidence regarding SMC at least as useful as that provided by 
performance on any particular exercise or array of exercises. 
Therefore the principle of academic honesty dictates that an 
instructor should make every effort within reason to provide 
grading exercises that accurately portray a student's SMC. 
Grades should be understood to reflect SMC because 
transcript readers use them, in general, to assess SMC. 
Psychometricians speak of a person's "true score": the score she 
would obtain on a perfect test of her ability, skill, or knowledge 
of a certain concept or subject area. Someone's performance on 
an individual test is thought to reflect closely her actual 
subject-matter competence depending on the test's accuracy. 
A student's performance on an individual test is thought to 
approximate more or less closely to her true score depending on 
the test's accuracy. Her test performance is used, in effect, to 
estimate her true score. (Thus, a "standard error of 
measurement" will be calculated for any typical widely-used 
standardized examination in order to help anyone interpreting 
a score on the examination to estimate how close to the test-
taker's true score her actual score is likely to fall.) By analogy, 
we may say that a transcript reader hopes that, when she 
reviews a student's transcript, she is learning as much as 
possible about the student's true grades. She is unlikely to 
be-and has no good reason to be-interested in information 
about the student's past academic performance for its own 
sake; she wants to know what she can expect from the student 
in the future. She is unlikely to be concerned about the 
vagaries of a student's performance on a particular exercise in 
a given course as a whole except as this helps her forecast the 
student's future performance. Thus, in turn, the instructor's 
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goal should be the determination of a student's true grade. 
Performance on a variety of individual exercises can be used to 
help the instructor identify the true grade. But what should be 
of interest to the instructor is the "true grade" itselr_31 
This obviously does not mean that grades should be 
determined in freewheeling abstraction from academic 
performance. There are good reasons for using performance as 
a key indicator of a student's true grade and, indeed, for 
choosing only rarely to assign a grade in light of anything other 
than the student's aggregate performance on all assigned 
exercises.12 In a given instance, evidence regarding a student's 
SMC is available apart from her aggregate class performance. 
Other bases for judgments regarding SMC may be available 
but there may be good reason to be uncertain of their reliability 
or accuracy. Taking factors other than aggregate class 
performance into account, especially in an individual case, may 
require an inefficient use of an instructor's time. Perhaps most 
importantly, fairness-like the need to ensure that grades are 
useful to transcript readers-requires that each comparable 
grade reflect a judgment regarding competence, understood in 
a consistent way, with respect to the same subject matter. 
Diversifying the ways in which instructors determine grades 
31. Thus, given the PAE, it is not helpful to say that a grade "represents a value 
judgment concerning the relative quality of a student's achievement of course objectives 
during a specified period of instruction," Terwilliger, supra n. 21, at 22 (emphasis 
added), or that it "is intended to represent an expert's judgment of the quality of a 
student's work within a specified area of inquiry, Cahn, supra n. 22, at 25 (emphasis 
added). A student's grade ought not to be a reflection simply or primarily of her 
"achievement" or "work" per se, but with this achievement or work as an estimator of 
SMC. Cahn concedes as much when he says that "[s]tudents who receive C's in 
introductory physics are not C persons with C personalities or C moral characters, but 
individuals who have achieved only a fair grasp of the fundamentals of elementary 
physics," supra n. 22, at 26 (emphasis added). Similarly, he notes that the fact that a 
student received an F in a course means that she "failed to master any significant part 
of it" and that "[a] person who requires two, three[,] or four attempts to pass calculus 
lacks the mathematical or study skills of someone who passes the first time .... " ld. at 
27 (emphasis added). He suggests that the instructor who "grades on a curve" has 
confused "rank in class ... with mastery of subject matter." !d. at 29 (emphasis added). 
,John S. Brubacher, On the Philosophy of Higher Education 108 (Jossey-Bass 
Publishers 1982) may elide the two distinct ideas when he argues that "grades should 
be regarded not merely as motivators but as genuine measures of achievement in the 
mastery of the higher learning." It is also possible to read Brubacher as focusing 
primarily on mastery-so that "achievement in the mastery of higher learning" means 
something like SMC. 
:32. I will subsequently use the expression aggregate class performance for this 
sort of performance. 
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runs the risk of multiplying the meanings of grades in 
particular courses. Further, consistent academic standards 
make it easier for an instructor to avoid being swayed by biases 
that have nothing to do with a student's academic capacities, 
and such standards are easiest to apply to students' 
performance on ordinary course assignments. So there are 
good reasons to focus on aggregate class performance when 
determining grades. 
That grades ought to reflect SMC is, as I have emphasized, 
no reason to ignore aggregate class performance. It is, 
however, a reason for an instructor to base grades only on 
student performance on exercises likely to lead to an accurate 
measure of students' true grades. It is also a reason for her to 
be open to evidence that might lead her to assign a student a 
grade different from the one she might assign if she attended 
only to aggregate class performance. This is so at any rate, 
presuming-and only presuming-that this evidence is 
genuinely reliable and likely to foster accuracy, that she can 
publicly justify her use of this evidence if she is willing to take 
comparable evidence into account when determining other 
students' grades if it is available. 
Ordinarily, the instructor is entitled to assume that the 
same evaluative methods are appropriate for all students, but 
this is only a presumption. Suppose she has a particular 
reason to believe that she can more accurately estimate a 
student's SMC using a technique other than the one she 
employs to estimate the grades of other students. In 
accordance with the PAE, she should use the more accurate 
approach, provided she can clearly document her reasons for 
employing it. Fairness dictates that she treats like cases alike 
and different cases differently. If she can demonstrate that a 
particular student's case is relevantly different from the cases 
of other students, it may be acceptable, and perhaps even 
obligatory, for her to assess this student differently in order to 
ensure that the student's grade is an accurate estimate of her 
SMC. 
SMC is not the bare ability to recall facts or em~loy ~ertain 
intellectual tools. An instructor may reasonably 1den~1fy the 
ability to make use of relevant skills, informatiOn, or 
understanding in a particular setting as ~n eleme~t of SMC. 
Thus, while it may sometimes be appropnate to d1scount the 
effects of intense situational pressure on a student, accurately 
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assessing SMC may sometimes require that a student's 
capacity to function under pressure be taken into account; in 
an exceptional case, performance under pressure may well be 
one of the skills that make up SMC. 
Students are relatively similar, and evidence suggesting 
that conventional evaluative exercises are inaccurate 
estimators of SMC will not often be available. Provided that 
appropriate exercises are assigned, aggregate course 
performance can be a good, though certainly not a perfect, 
indicator of a student's SMC. 
II. ACADEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RETRIBUTIVISM 
A variety of conventional academic practices appear 
inconsistent with the principle of academic exclusivity (PAE). 
These practices are almost always defended using one of two 
possible theoretical approaches: academic consequentialism 
and academic retributivism. Here this paper will explore 
particular issues in the ethics of grading and will address 
specific arguments that proponents of each of these positions 
might offer. However, before turning to specifics, some more 
general observations about these approaches should be made 
as to why, neither approach is arguably plausible. 
A. Academic Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is the thesis that the moral rightness or 
wrongness of an act is a function of the state of affairs it brings 
into being-of its consequences. Academic consequentialism is 
the application of consequentialism to grading. Someone 
committed to general academic consequentialism will make 
grading decisions with the purpose of bringing about the 
greatest possible amount of good in the universe, whereas, 
someone committed to restricted academic consequentialism 
will make grading decisions with the purpose of bringing about 
the greatest possible amount of some more narrowly specified 
good. 
The academic consequentialist will be inclined to 
understand a grade in instrumental terms. She will 
understand it as a means of motivating transcript readers of 
various sorts to view a student with favor or disfavor. 
Furthermore, because the possible reactions of transcript 
readers to a grade can affect the student's welfare, grading 
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criteria will also serve as a means of motivating the student. 
The instructor's authority to assign grades gives her 
considerable leverage over a student's behavior, and if applying 
a consequentialist view, she will use this authority. Whenever 
it is likely to prove effective, a consequentialist instructor may 
use the threat of a bad grade or the promise of a good one to 
prompt a student to behave in ways that maximize the good. 
Similarly, she will use her ability to motivate transcript 
readers by means of the grades she assigns to respond 
favorably to students with the goal of maximizing the good. 
To begin with general academic consequentialism: suppose 
a student from a wealthy family is experiencing academic 
difficulties at a secondary school or university. Aware that a 
positive report from the student may lead the student's mother 
to be exceptionally generous when approached by university 
development personnel, a consequentialist instructor might 
conclude under some circumstances, assuming the institution 
serves the general good, it would make sense to use a grade as 
a means of increasing the student's satisfaction with the 
institution and the consequent likelihood of a substantial gift 
from the student's mother. 33 
It is not certain, of course what this instructor should do on 
consequentialist grounds. The circumstances may lead him to 
believe that, on the balance, assigning an inaccurate grade to 
this student would be counter-productive. The consequentialist 
is not usually committed to grading inaccurately. There is no 
consequentialist reason why, in general, he shouldn't at least 
consider the possible impact of a grade on her institution's 
bottom line. 
This is, of course, just the sort of counter-intuitive example 
regularly canvassed in the literature on consequentialism.:34 It 
will strike some readers as extreme; it is presented here with 
the suspicion that most instructors will be disinclined to 
approve of using grades to increase donations. However, the 
33. Alternatively, suppose that an instructor wishes to benefit a socioeconomically 
disadvantaged student. A good grade will help the student obtain educational and 
professional opportunities that will increase her socioeconomic status. 
34. For a classic challenge of this sort, see H. J. McCloskey, A Note on Utilitarian 
Punishment, 72 Mind 599 (1963) (a utilitarian sheriff might deliberately execute an 
innocent person to prevent a riot that might lead to bloodshed). For a genial utilitarian 
response, see J. J. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J. J. C. Smart 
& Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 1, 69-72 (Cambridge U. Press 
1973). 
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sections that follow suggest that rejecting academic 
consequentialism has implications for a variety of common 
academic practices. 
There are good reasons for rejecting consequentialism 
generally. Perhaps most fundamentally, consequentialism 
depends on the assumption that it is possible, in some 
meaningful way, to aggregate goods or preferences to permit 
the global comparison of states of affairs. But if particular 
human goods and particular instances of human goods are 
incommensurable, so that this kind of aggregation is 
impossible, consequentialism can't get off the ground. 
Consequentialism can also be criticized because it seems to be 
blind to distributional issues many of us think are morally 
significant; because it seems unable to take adequate account 
of special responsibilities and special relationships like 
friendship; it instrumentalizes relationships, projects, and 
values we tend to think of as intrinsically valuable; and 
because it gives a poor account of promise-keeping and truth-
telling.35 
The rejection of a consequentialist rationale for grading will 
often be motivated by the intuition that assigning grades as a 
means of enhancing the general welfare flies in the face of the 
commitment to the truth that is central to academic life. 
Truth-telling is central to and definitive of the practices of 
teaching, learning, and scholarship. Even those who do not 
believe that consequentialism is a non-starter as a moral 
theory may still be skeptical about the use of a general 
consequentialist rationale for assigning grades. 36 
35. For criticisms of consequentialist approaches, see Alasdair C. Macintyre, 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 61-63, 67-68, 185 (2d ed., U. of Notre Dame 
Press 1984); Finnis, supra n. 30, at 111-119; John M. Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics 
80-108 (Oxford U. Press 1983); John M. Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. & Germain G. 
Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism 177-296 (Oxford U. Press 1987); 
Germain G. Grisez & Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of 
Freedom (3rd. ed., U. of Notre Dame Press 1988); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 86-87, 151-154 (3d ed., U. of Notre Dame 
Press 1984); Bernard A. 0. Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Harper & 
Row 1993); Bernard A. 0. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in Smart & Williams, 
supra n. 32, at 77-150; Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford U. 
Press 2000); and Robert Merrihew Adams, Saints, in The Virtue of Faith and Other 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford U. Press 1988) 
36. A defender of consequentialism might point out that widespread assignment 
of grades for reasons unrelated to SMC would diminish their usefulness. A 
consequentialist grader would obviously have good reason to follow a broad 
consequentialist rationale for grading sparingly. However, this clearly wouldn't give 
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The inappropriateness of academic consequentialism is 
apparent even when the academic consequentialist seeks to 
maximize something other than the general welfare. 37 The most 
obvious sort of restricted academic consequentialism urges the 
assignment of grades as a means to motivate student learning. 
The instructor might seek to benefit a student by giving her a 
grade that suggests that she has more SMC than she actually 
does in order to improve her confidence and encourage her to 
remain in school and continue learning. The instructor might 
seek to benefit a student by giving her a grade that suggests 
that she has less SMC than she actually does in order to 
encourage her to avoid what the instructor believes is 
irresponsible academic conduct that may limit her learning in 
other contexts. The instructor might seek to benefit a group of 
which the student is a member by giving her a grade that 
suggests that she has less SMC than she actually does in order 
to maintain confidence in a system of grading norms the 
instructor believes will motivate students to learn effectively. 
In all of these above cases, the instructor's goals are 
academic in nature. She seeks to promote effective learning. 
However, like general academic consequentialism, restricted 
academic consequentialism is indefensible. It requires the 
same impossible commensuration of consequences on which 
consequentialism in general depends. The range of 
consequences the restricted academic consequentialist is 
prepared to consider is narrower than those the general 
academic consequentialist is prepared to consider. But this 
does not change the fact that the academic and nonacademic 
factors at issue in decisions about academic evaluation cannot 
be objectively measured on a common scale. And like general 
academic consequentialism, restricted academic 
consequentialism counter-intuitively violates the principle of 
the would-be-consequentialist grader a reason not to give a grade for welfare-
maximizing reasons in any given case. And the consequentialist's willingness to offer 
this observation might perhaps be seen as respect for the independent worth of 
intuitions for which, on consequentialist grounds, she need have no regard, and thus as 
a concession of consequentialism's inadequacy. If it is a defense of consequentialism to 
show that it yields results consistent with certain non-consequentialist intuitions, the 
implication seems to be that if it did not do so it might be worth revising or 
abandoning. 
37. Again, I want to emphasize that intending to maximize the general welfare is 
like intending to draw a square circle: it's not doable even in principle. But it is surely 
possible to intend to do something impossible. 
37] ETHICS OF GRADING 53 
truth-telling. Restricted academic consequentialism is 
designed to foster learning and the discovery of truth. 
Ironically and self-defeatingly, consequentialism leads 
instructors to deny the truth as a means of promoting the 
acquisition and dissemination of truth. 
There seems to be little reason why an authentic 
consequentialist would choose on a consistent basis to be a 
restricted academic consequentialist. Similarly, there is little 
reason for someone not inclined to consequentialism in the first 
place to regard it as appropriate in an academic environment 
alone. A conventional consequentialist will make 
conduciveness to the general welfare the ultimate criteria for 
her actions (she won't necessarily appeal to this criterion when 
making individual decisions, of course). She will wish to take 
all consequences into account (directly or indirectly), and 
someone with principled objections to consequentialism in 
general won't be able to defend consequentialism as a 
normative defense for a particular approach to academic 
evaluation. An intuitionist moralist might not face a charge of 
personal inconsistency if she argued for the appropriateness of 
consequentialist reasoning under some circumstances and of 
other kinds of moral reasoning under others.38 However, she 
will still need to confront the general positive objections to 
consequentialism. Others will be forced to choose between 
adopting general academic consequentialism (and 
consequentialism more generally) with predictable but 
implausible and undesirable results, or rejecting 
consequentialisms of all sorts in favor of more satisfactory 
approaches to moral reasoning about, among other things, 
academic life. 
B. Academic Retributiuism 
Retributivism is the view that the criminal justice system, 
among others, should allocate benefits and harms to people in 
light of what they purportedly deserve. Academic retributiuism 
is the concept that a grade may in part rightly reflect a moral 
judgment regarding a student's character as it manifests itself 
38. The sort of intuitionism I have in mind is the sort best represented by W.D. 
Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford U. Press 1930); and W. David Ross, Foundations 
of Ethics: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935-1936 
(Oxford U. Press 1939); see generally Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (B1ackwell1993). 
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in academic contexts. Under academic retributivism, a grade 
may be in part a means of rewarding a student for morally 
good academic conduct and punishing her for morally bad 
academic conduct. 
Academic retributivism is objectionable on several counts. 
Again, it leads to results inconsistent with the principle of 
academic incommensurability and the principle of truth-telling. 
I will explore the ways in which it does so in greater detail 
later in this paper. I want to point out here at a more general 
level that academic retributivism can be rejected on the same 
basis as retributivism in general. 
A basic flaw in all forms of retributivism is that they 
transplant ways of reasoning that seem appropriate in the 
economic sphere into the non-economic sectors of our lives. If I 
unjustly cause you to lose something that is purely 
instrumental in value, purely monetary in worth, then I can 
compensate you for this loss by providing you with a 
replacement or substitute or simply by giving you the monetary 
equivalent of what I have caused you to lose. What matters is 
not that I have lost something in the process but that you have 
been made whole. 
Retributivism transfers the logic of economic exchange into 
an arena in which it makes no sense. We speak of retribution 
as a matter of "paying back" someone who has done something 
harmful. But this is a case of metaphorical language doing 
work that ought to be done by careful philosophical argument. 
The idea of punishment for moral wrong means causing some 
harm to me because I have caused some putatively equivalent 
harm to you. But it is easy to see that, once stripped of the 
support provided to this idea by out-of-place economic 
metaphors, it is fundamentally nonsensical. Suppose I tell lies 
about you to our mutual friends and cause you to lose one or 
more important close relationships. The logic of retribution 
suggests that I should suffer some harm as a result. It is 
obvious, however, that any harm I might suffer could itself 
restore your relationship with any friend from whom you've 
become alienated because of my deception. 39 Even if I am 
39. Of course, I am obligated to do my best to repair the breach I have caused. 
And in the course of doing this I may suffer harms of one sort or another. But the 
notion that harms may follow on attempts to redress wrongs is quite different from the 
notion that such harms should follow and that their occurrence is or can be a 
constitutive part of what redressing them means. 
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punished, you are no better off after I've suffered some punitive 
harm than you were before. 40 You haven't been paid back at 
all. If you believe or feel that you have, it's because you 
misconstrue harm to you as a benefit to me because of the 
curious logic of retribution.41 
It should be obvious that, as an instance of retributivism in 
general, academic retributivism is indefensible for the same 
reason that retributivism in general is indefensible. The 
retributive punishment of students who have caused 
academically cognizable harms of one sort or another harms 
the students but does not itself constitute any sort of real 
restitution to those they have harmed.42 Retribution is not a 
means of effecting restitution. This is true whether grading is 
used as a means of retribution (positive or negative) for moral 
conduct and character generally (general academic 
retributivism) or only for a narrower range of acts and 
character traits perceived to be directly relevant to the life of 
the academy (restricted academic retributivism). 
General academic retributivism suffers from the 
incoherence of retributivism generally. It also leads to 
intuitively implausible consequences. On general retributivist 
grounds, it seems as if grades should reflect a range of student 
virtues. Perhaps, for instance, a student who saves a drowning 
boater on the school's lake might deserve higher grades. 
40. Strike & Soltis, supra n. 23, at 29 ("Perhaps the weakest point in the 
retribution theory of punishment is the suggestion that the universe somehow requires 
that evildoers be punished with a compensating quantity of pain. Why should we 
believe this? The point can be put more forcefully. The retribution theory seems to 
require that we respond to one evil event by adding a second. How is the universe 
improved by adding an additional piece of suffering to it? If we are to punish evildoers, 
ought we not to expect some good to result? Otherwise, does not punishment merely 
add gratuitously to the pain in the world?"). 
41. A policy or institution created with retributive rationales may sometimes be 
defended on consequentialist grounds. Retribution is seen, for instance, as deterring 
subsequent harmful conduct by others, as treating the punished person as an example 
to others. If the use of consequentialist arguments involves a repudiation of the 
previously-advanced retributivist ones, then we do not need to attend to retributivist 
arguments for the policy or institution; those already outlined and subsequently 
elaborated against consequentialism will suffice. If, by contrast, the consequentialist 
arguments serve primarily to provide a cover for atavistic retributivist impulses, then 
the counter to retributivism I have offered here and on which I will expand below will 
show the policy or institution to be undesirable. 
42. Again, these students may be harmed instrumentally, with the purpose of 
bringing about some benefit to others-perhaps the others they have harmed. But in 
this case they are being harmed on consequentialist grounds, and the standard 
objections to consequentialism will apply. 
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Perhaps a student who helps classmates study should be 
rewarded by receiving an "A" instead of an "A-", and so on. 
General academic retributivism seems highly implausible. 
A defender of retributivism may be inclined to suggest that 
this paper mischaracterizes what retributivism actually looks 
like in practice. For the retributivist, there needs to be some 
sort of equivalence between a student's conduct or character 
and the way she is treated. She ought to suffer the sort of 
harm she has done, experience the kind of good she has 
fostered. The rule of equivalence seems to exert a measure of 
control over what retributivists might be prepared to argue and 
to help them avoid absurd conclusions. But there are two 
problems with this response. 
First, individual harms and benefits aren't commensurable. 
Once we've left the monetary realm, it is impossible to say even 
that two instances of a given human good could be exchanged 
for each other. Second, we don't ordinarily seek this kind of 
equivalence when we practice retributivism-academic, or 
otherwise. An equivalence-based rationale makes the most 
sense as a defense of execution as a judicial response to 
murder, though even here it does not, of course, for the same 
reason that retributivism generally doesn't work: the 
murderer's loss of life obviously does nothing for the victim or 
the victim's survivors.43 It makes no sense at all in other 
contexts, and we don't even act as if it did. We don't lie to the 
academically dishonest; we don't see to it that late students are 
forced to wait. The punishments educational institutions seek 
on retributivist grounds to impose on students who cause 
academically cognizable harms aren't in any obvious sense 
equivalent to those harms, even if we grant the retributivist's 
commensurability assumption. These practices cannot, 
therefore, be plausibly defended on retributivist grounds. In 
43. Craig Kinzer has suggested that an objector could argue that the beneficiary 
here is the community rather than the victim or her survivors, but it is not clear how 
best to make sense of this notion. If the idea is that the community is better off 
because a person with a propensity for violence has been eliminated, so that there is no 
possibility that she will harm anyone in the future, then the objector seems to be 
making a consequentialist argument, subject to the standard criticisms of 
consequentialism. (In any case, it is not clear why life imprisonment cannot, in 
principle, accomplish the same sort of risk reduction.) By contrast, if the objector 
believes that the community simply is better because someone who has caused someone 
else to lose something has lost something herself, I confess puzzlement. I do not see 
how the criminal's loss can be construed as constituting a gain for the community 
absent some doubtful economistic assumptions that seem inappropriate in this context. 
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any case, however, whatever the counter-intuitive character of 
the conclusions to which academic retributivism might be 
thought to lead, the essentially incoherent and misleading 
character of academic retributivism makes it an inappropriate 
basis for academic decision-making. 
Ill. THE P AE AND COMMON ACADEMIC PRACTICES 
Consequentialism and retributivism are unattractive 
guides to the moral life generally and to the ethics of grading in 
particular. They give us no good reason to reject the principle 
of academic exclusivity (PAE). Given that the PAE is plausible 
on other grounds and that there are good reasons for rejecting 
the alternatives the educational community should endorse the 
PAE. 
The PAE has implications for grading practices in a number 
of areas: the use of attendance to determine grades, the role of 
homework and busywork in grading, the treatment of academic 
dishonesty, policies regarding changes in grades, policies 
related to late work, and procedures regarding incomplete 
grades. In this section, I explain these implications and defend 
the conclusions I draw from the PAE about grading practices. 
Though I challenge some common evaluative practices, I do not 
wish to deny that the goods they seek to serve are often 
valuable. I simply wish to argue that educational institutions 
should employ means consistent with the PAE to accomplish 
worthwhile nonacademic goals. 
A. Attendance and Participation 
In light of the PAE, there is little or no reason for an 
instructor to take a student's attendance into account when 
assigning her a grade. Using participation to help determine a 
student's grade can, however, be consistent with the PAE. 
That a student attends a lecture is not, in and of itself, a 
particularly good reason to believe that she possesses any 
particular level of SMC. It may be more likely that a given 
student will be more competent with respect to the subject 
matter of a class if she attends it than if she does not. But 
attendance itself does not demonstrate SMC, and absence does 
not show a lack of SMC. A student's presence at a class is not 
the kind of performance that could even in principle 
demonstrate that she is competent with respect to the subject 
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matter of the class. At best, it can demonstrate a degree of 
exposure to the subject matter that might provide limited 
support for the contention that she has SMC. Whether she 
does or not can be assessed in a variety of ways other than 
noting her attendance or absence. Either an instructor has 
reason to believe the evaluative instruments she uses to assess 
her students' SMC are reasonably accurate or she does not. If 
the instructor believes grades are an accurate reflection of 
SMC then it is difficult to see how she could reasonably believe 
that altering grades based on sheer attendance would improve 
her ability to estimate her students' SMC. If she believes they 
are not, then she ought to replace them. She should not rely on 
attendance-based measures to improve the accuracy of her 
grades. Increasing or decreasing a student's grade because of 
her attendance record means implying, inaccurately, that she 
possesses a degree of SMC for which her attendance provides 
no evidence. It violates her duty to avoid deception. 
An instructor is generally unlikely to take attendance into 
account when determining grades simply or primarily because 
she thinks attendance is an especially good indicator of SMC. 
She may have some other rationale. 
(1) She may believe that attendance reflects habits and 
character traits likely to be of interest to transcript readers, 
and she may suppose her student's grades should communicate 
these habits and traits. 
(2) She may seek to offer students an incentive to develop 
these habits and traits; she may wish to offer students an 
incentive to attend because she believes attendance is crucial to 
learning. 
(3) She may wish to punish students for what she believes 
is a morally irresponsible choice not to learn and develop habits 
of punctuality and attendance at scheduled appointments. 
(4) She may believe that a student who fails to attend her 
classes will waste her time and that of others both by asking 
questions in or outside class that would have been answer~d 
had the student attended class. She may believe that they w1ll 
waste her time by submitting examinations or out-of-class 
assignments which she will be forced to grade even th~u~h the 
displayed level of SMC is too low for the work to be m1~nmally 
satisfactory. She may also believe that those who arnve late 
will waste her time and the time of other. students by 
disrupting her classes when they arrive. She m1ght thus seek 
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to use her grading scheme to discourage students from being 
late or absent. 
All of these objectives except the third are appropriate, but 
none is appropriately achieved using grades. None justifies 
violating the PAE by allowing a student's attendance to affect 
her grade. 
(1) To repeat, a grade should not be best thought of as 
reflecting a variety of nonacademic character traits. Transcript 
readers have no way of knowing whether or not a grade might 
have been affected by these traits. Because nonacademic 
character traits are so different from the SMC a grade is 
intended primarily to measure, it is meaningless to combine 
character traits with SMC in determining a student's grade. 
(2) Attendance is surely useful for students. The desire for 
a good grade or the fear of a bad one may prompt a student to 
attend class. And offering credit of one kind or another for 
attendance will obviously not have the sort of affect on student 
behavior an instructor is likely to desire unless she fulfills her 
attendance-related promises or threats. If she intends to use 
her grading scheme as an attendance motivator, she must, in 
accordance with that scheme, give students who attend higher 
grades than they would have otherwise received in light of the 
available measures of their SMC and, conversely, give students 
who are late, or who fail to attend, lower grades. This sort of 
practice demands an academic consequentialist justification. 
But academic consequentialism in general is unwarranted. 
Further, in assigning grades for consequentialist reasons, an 
instructor clearly violates the PAE. She fails to tell the truth 
about her students' SMC. Some students may receive poor 
grades because of their poor attendance. They may suffer later 
because they have acquired poor habits. But the goal of 
preventing these harms does not justify violating the PAE. 
(3) Poor attendance may sometimes be a moral wrong, but 
so is assigning grades based on attendance. Doing so depends 
on the incoherent idea of retribution and involves 
misrepresenting students' SMC. Thus, it violates the PAE. 
(4) An instructor may be warranted in the belief that late 
or absent students will waste her time or the time of other 
students, and that she can use the threat of poor grades to 
deter such waste. But again, consequentialist arguments of 
this sort are unconvincing both because consequentialism is a 
non-starter and because truth-telling underlies the PAE. In 
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any case, the instructor has other means of preventing time 
from being wasted. For instance, it would be consistent with 
the P AE for an instructor to require that a student drop a class 
if, whether because of perpetual absence or for some other 
reason, the student took up an excessive amount of her time 
and showed no promise of gaining satisfactory competence with 
respect to the subject matter of the class before the end of the 
term during which the class was taking place. The PAE would 
require only that the student's transcript reflect the fact that 
she was forcibly dropped from the class and that it make clear 
that any grade recorded is an estimate made at the time she 
dropped rather than a grade determined on the basis of a 
term's worth of assignments. 
Unlike attendance, a student's participation in class 
discussions can provide an instructor with useful information 
regarding a student's SMC. It is thus quite consistent with the 
PAE for an instructor to take into account what a student says 
during class discussions and how she says it in determining the 
student's grade, provided she focuses on what the student's 
participation reveals about her SMC.44 It would not, by 
contrast, be appropriate for an instructor to reward a student 
just because she participated. The instructor should not give 
the student credit for participation without attending to what 
she says and how she says it as indices of SMC. If she does, 
she runs the risk of effectively rewarding a student for 
attendance alone-or perhaps for exhibiting the virtuous habit 
of helping others learn-and thus is guilty of violating the 
PAE. 
B. Reading and Writing Assignments 
The PAE rules out assigning grades on the basis of 
"busywork." It precludes taking into account the simple fact 
44. An instructor may believe-plausibly-that participation plays a vital role in 
facilitating the learning of others. She may also believe-plausibly-that a student is 
likely to read and think more carefully than she otherwise might when preparing for a 
class in which participation is required and that her subject-matter competence will 
consequently be enhanced. She may thus welcome a variety of positive consequences 
affected by a decision to award credit for participation, and the PAE gives her no 
reason not to do so. It merely stipulates that the potential value of these consequences 
gives her no independent justification for taking participation into account when she 
determines her students' grades and no basis for evaluating student participation, if 
she requires it, in a way that fails to focus on its value as a means of estimating 
students' likely subject-matter competence. 
371 ETHICS OF GRADING 61 
that a student has or has not read a body of assigned material 
at a particular time. More controversially, it discourages 
instructors from basing grades on a student's performance on 
homework exercises designed to help the student build skills. 
According to the PAE, a student's performance on an 
assignment should contribute to the determination ofher grade 
to the extent that it helps her instructor estimate her SMC. An 
assignment which allows more precise estimation of a 
particular aspect of a student's SMC should be preferred to one 
which allows less. Given the PAE, it would never be 
appropriate to give credit to a student simply for reading an 
assigned text, as opposed to completing a review that shows 
critical engagement with the text. The purpose of offering 
credit simply for reading a text would be roughly the same as 
the purpose of offering credit for attendance and being prompt 
or for rewarding good behavior and discouraging or punishing 
bad behavior. Evidence that a student has read a text is 
evidence that she has been exposed to certain material, not that 
she has understood it or engaged with it critically. In most 
cases, evidence that she has not read a text is only presumptive 
evidence that she has not been exposed to the relevant material 
as she could have been exposed to it in some other way.45 In any 
case, an instructor's evaluative exercises give her a much more 
accurate means of assessing a student's SMC than simple 
knowledge that a student has read a portion of an assigned 
text. 
There is no hard-and-fast distinction between practice-
oriented, skill-building homework exercises and others, which 
serve primarily to facilitate the accurate assessment of SMC, 
such as in-class examinations. However, it is clear that some 
homework exercises are designed primarily to help students 
acquire proficiencies of various sorts instead of measuring 
SMC. Homework exercises in mathematics classes are obvious 
examples; a student practices problems of a certain type to 
learn how to approach an indefinite variety of possible future 
problems of the same sort. Whether she has in fact learned to 
do so will be estimated using examinations that measure her 
abilities under monitored and time-controlled conditions. 
45. Obviously, in a course in literature a student usually cannot be exposed to all 
of the relevant material except by reading the assigned text; digesting Cliffs Notes will 
tell a student something useful about Huckleberry Finn, but the student won't discover 
the delights of Twain's language or engage directly with his literary artistry. 
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In accordance with the PAE, an instructor should where 
possible, avoid basing grades on students' performance on 
repetitive, skill-building exercises CRSEs). Instructors should 
assign such exercises where appropriate, but they may violate 
the PAE when used to estimate students' SMC and in 
determining their grades. In most cases, a student's 
performance on examinations, papers, and projects will provide 
a much better basis for estimating her SMC. Information 
gained from students' performance on RSEs will often be, at 
best, superfluous. Consider four possibilities: (1) a student 
does well on examinations, papers, and projects and on RSEs; 
(2) the student does well on RSEs and poorly on examinations, 
papers, and projects; (3) the student does poorly on RSEs (or 
does not complete them at all) and well on examinations, 
papers, and projects; (4) the student does poorly on RSEs and 
on examinations, papers, and projects. 
In cases (1) and (4), the RSEs provide the instructor with no 
useful information as she determines the student's grade. In 
case (2), the instructor has some reason to suspect that the 
student is cheating, receiving help, or taking an inordinate 
amount of time to complete the RSEs. It is also possible, of 
course, that the student is a poor test-taker but is developing 
genuine SMC, which is revealed by her performance on the 
RSEs. If the instructor believes that this is the case, she 
cannot do so on the basis of the RSEs, the interpretation of 
which is in question. And she cannot do so on the basis of the 
student's overall examination performance, which is, ex 
hypothesi, poor. If, nonetheless, she is warranted in believing 
that the student is acquiring more SMC than the student's 
examination performance suggests, the PAE suggests that this 
belief might appropriately be reflected in the grade she assigns 
the student. However, in this case, the determinative fact 
would be that she has independent reason to believe the RSEs 
reflect the student's true SMC more accurately than do 
examinations instead of making a general decision to base 
grades in whole, or in part, on RSE performance. 
In case (3), the instructor has little or no reason to base the 
student's grade on her RSE performance, provided the 
instructor is confident that her examinations, papers, and 
projects enable her to accurately estimate the student's true 
grade. If they do, the student's RSE scores are superfluous and 
reducing the student's grade because of her RSE performance 
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will violate the PAE, given that the grade will be a less 
accurate estimate of her SMC than if her RSE scores are 
excluded. 
It is possible, of course, that the instructor reasonably 
believes that her examinations alone do not allow her to 
accurately estimate a student's SMC and that it is not 
practicable for her to design them in such a way that they do. 
If she reasonably believes this, and if she also reasonably 
believes that combining RSE performance with examination 
performance allows her to estimate the student's grade more 
accurately than would considering examination performance 
alone, she does not violate the P AE by taking RSE performance 
into account. It is unclear, however, what would provide 
evidence that taking RSEs into account when determining 
grades yields a more accurate estimate of SMC than not 
considering them. 46 And it is crucial to ensure that, in the rare 
cases in which RSEs are rightly taken into account, grades are 
not influenced by such irrelevancies as a capable student's lack 
of interest in completing busywork. Even if an instructor takes 
RSEs into account when determining some students' grades, 
she need not do so when determining any given student's grade 
unless doing so increases the likelihood that she will accurately 
estimate the student's SMC.47 
Of course, instructors may tend to give students credit for 
their RSE performance not because they believe that RSE 
performance is a good estimator of students' true grades but 
because they believe that by doing so they will encourage 
students to complete RSEs and thus to master relevant skills. 
But this sort of academic consequentialist reasoning falls foul 
46. Where there is a significant disparity between a student's performance on a 
comprehensive final examination and her performance on prior examinations during a 
course, a similar problem may arise; if so, a similar analysis would apply in accordance 
with the PAE. If the final examination yields an estimate of a student's subject-matter 
competence that is clearly more accurate than one based on consideration of all 
examinations, the instructor should focus on the final examination when determining 
the student's grade. But there is a stronger case to be made for the view that 
performance on prior examinations is a useful contributor to an overall assessment of a 
student's subject matter competence than there is for the view that RSE performance 
should play this role. And, indeed, there is a reason to believe that single examination 
is a less accurate estimator of students' subject matter competence than an array of 
exilminations or other exercises. 
4 7. Educational institutions rightly care about students' self-discipline, but 
students' character development is best encouraged in ways that do not affect their 
grades. But see the discussion oflate and missed work, infra. 
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of the standard criticisms of academic consequentialism and 
will, in some cases, lead an instructor to violate the PAE. An 
instructor violates the PAE if, on the basis of a student's RSE 
performance, she gives a lower grade to the student than her 
examination performance suggests she should receive, not 
because the examination performance is an inaccurate 
estimator of the student's SMC, but because the instructor 
wishes to maintain a system of incentives for other students to 
build skills by completing RSEs or for the student to develop 
better study habits. 
The PAE requires a preference for examinations and 
essays, rather than RSEs, as means of estimating students' 
SMC and determining grades. In accordance with the PAE, 
quizzes may also be taken into account in determining grades 
to the extent that they can serve as accurate snapshots of 
student performance rather than as motivational tools 
designed to spur students to prepare for class discussions or 
attend class. An instructor may welcome the positive 
motivational impact of the practice of administering regular 
quizzes, but this practice must be justified on other grounds-
otherwise, it will, in reality, be serving inappropriate 
consequentialist or retributivist purposes. 
C. Service-Learning 
Engaging in service activities can be a valuable way of 
learning about social problems and developing habits of 
compassion and generosity. It is perfectly reasonable that 
service activities might be among the learning experiences 
associated with a given course. However, the PAE dictates 
that students be graded in light of their SMC, not their 
participation in these activities. 
The usual sorts of inappropriate reasons may be given for 
awarding credit for service-learning. Consequentialists will 
wish to encourage participation in service ventures and the 
development of useful habits. Retributivists will wish to 
reward the virtuous who participate and punish the selfish who 
do not. Based on the arguments already presented, these 
reasons are facially unpersuasive. 
Participation in a service activity connected with a given 
course may foster the development of competence with respect 
to the subject matter of the course, presuming the activity has 
been selected with an eye to fostering class-specific learning 
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rather than simply encouraging the development of the more 
general habits of compassion and generosity. But even if an 
activity has been selected to help students develop SMC, 
evaluative instruments should be employed to determine 
whether students have actually acquired greater SMC as a 
result of participating in it. It cannot be assumed that they 
have acquired greater SMC simply because they have 
participated in service-learning activities, and it cannot be 
assumed that they have not acquired greater SMC because 
they have not participated. Ordinary evaluative instruments 
are likely to be far more effective at estimating students' SMC 
than the mere participation in service-learning activities. 
Service-learning, as currently understood, characteristically 
includes a reflective component. Students are asked to explore 
the meaning of the service activities in which they have 
engaged and to explain what the activities might have taught 
them. Provided such reflective exercises are taken seriously 
and evaluated as possible estimators of SMC, instructors may 
reasonably consider them when determining grades. It will be 
important, however, not to give them undue weight or to 
evaluate them using standards different from those employed 
with respect to other evaluative instruments. Otherwise, it 
will be difficult to escape the conclusion that students are being 
rewarded simply for participating in service activities or 
punished for not participating, thus violating the PAE. 
To be sure, it is conceivable that some kinds of learning can 
happen only through doing. It may not be possible for a 
student to acquire some kinds of habits and attitudes without 
participating in service-learning activities. But habits of 
compassion and generosity are quite different from SMC; this 
incommensurability makes combining service-learning 
activities with measures of SMC to determine grades a dubious 
enterprise. Further, grades, as conventionally understood, do 
not measure or reflect habits of this sort, so taking the 
development or exhibition of such characteristics into account 
violates the PAE's truth-telling requirement. Grades are 
concerned with more narrowly cognitive capacities. It is 
reasonable for institutions and instructors to assess students' 
affective and moral development but this assessment should be 
distinguished from grading. 
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D. Late Work 
In accordance with the PAE, a student's grade should not 
be reduced because the work that is the basis for her grade is 
late. The PAE licenses limited exceptions to this norm based 
on the need to avoid substantial inconvenience and to ensure 
the usefulness of evaluative instruments. 
The PAE-based argument against grade reductions for 
lateness is simple and straightforward. A grade is a rough 
measure of a student's SMC. The purpose of evaluative 
instruments is to help the instructor estimate a student's SMC. 
The time at which a student submits an exercise often provides 
minimal evidence regarding her SMC. A paper on Milton 
submitted on Thursday can provide the same sort of useful 
information about the student's competence as a paper 
submitted on the previous Monday. To reduce the grade for the 
paper submitted on Thursday because it is late would increase 
the probability of an inaccurate assessment of the author's 
SMC. It would therefore violate the PAE. 
Some potential justifications for lateness discounts are 
similar to those offered for grade reductions based on 
attendance. Such justifications are subject to the same 
rebuttals and will be similarly unsuccessful. Given both the 
implausibility of academic consequentialism and retributivism 
and the positive requirements of the PAE, academic 
consequentialist and retributivist arguments for lateness 
discounts fail. Encouraging student responsibility or punishing 
student irresponsibility does not warrant inaccurate grading. 
However, accurate grading should not become a 
monomaniacal passion for any instructor. There are other 
things besides grading that rightly claim the instructor's time 
and attention. She is not obligated to subject herself to 
substantial inconvenience because her students have behaved 
irresponsibly. She has the right to delay her assignment of 
grades for students who have submitted exercises after she has 
requested that these exercises be submitted. If grading an 
exercise would create a substantial inconvenience for her but 
the student wishes that the grade be submitted at the same 
time that she assigns all other grades, the instructor has the 
right, under the P AE, to grade the exercise more cursorily than 
she would have graded it had it arrived on time. She may act 
in these, and perhaps other, ways to reduce unreasonable 
inconvenience created by a student's late submission of 
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exercises. What she may not do, at least ordinarily, is reduce 
the grade on a paper she has, in fact, taken the time to grade 
carefully simply because the paper is late. If an inaccuracy in a 
student's grade results from a cursory review of an exercise 
because the exercise was late, this inaccuracy may simply be 
an unintended byproduct of the instructor's reasonable desire 
to avoid excessive inconvenience. By contrast, a lateness-based 
reduction in a grade for an exercise an instructor has chosen to 
inconvenience herself by evaluating with reasonable care is-
even if it is also something else-an intentional act of 
deception, and thus a violation of the PAE. 
The PAE would permit an instructor to accept a late 
exercise from a student while discounting the student's 
performance on the exercise when determining the student's 
final grade. In light of the PAE, it would be appropriate for an 
instructor to do so if she reasonably believed that the student's 
access to time and information not possessed by others 
completing the exercise reduced the value of the student's 
performance as a predictor of her SMC. The PAE would also 
permit an instructor to simply decline to accept late work in 
some cases. Suppose, for instance, that an examination has 
been distributed to, and completed by, most students in a class. 
If the instructor reasonably believes that a student who was 
absent at the time the examination was administered has had 
opportunity to confer with others who have taken the 
examination and may well have done so, it would be 
permissible under the P AE for her to decline to administer the 
examination to the student. If the student possessed advance 
knowledge of the examination's contents then her performance 
on the examination could not be used accurately to predict her 
SMC. In such a case, the instructor might prepare an alternate 
examination. If constructing such an alternate examination 
proves a source of significant inconvenience, the PAE requires 
that she attempt to estimate the student's course grade based 
on the other resources available to her. Whether she should 
assume that the student possesses some competence with 
respect to the subject matter that is the focus of the missed 
examination, or whether she should treat the student as 
having no competence with respect to this subject matter, 
depends on the other information available to her about the 
student's SMC. 
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E. Incomplete Conversions and Other Grade Changes 
When faced with a request that she change one 
conventional letter grade to another or substitute a 
conventional letter grade for an "incomplete" ("I"), an instructor 
must consider the probable degree of the inaccuracy, the likely 
cost to the student, and the cost to possible transcript readers if 
the grade remains unchanged, as well as the inconvenience to 
herself. In accordance with the PAE, she may rightly refuse to 
change or convert a grade if doing so serves the interests of 
accuracy or convenience. However, the PAE precludes any 
institutional policy that, for punitive or motivational reasons, 
places any limit on an instructor's freedom to change a 
student's grade after she has submitted it or which requires 
that an incomplete grade become a failing grade ("E" or "F") 
after a specified deadline. 
Given the invalidity of retributivist and consequentialist 
rationales for grade assignment, an instructor should never 
change a grade except in the interests of accuracy. Of course, 
the passage of time, often a key issue in disputes related to 
grade changes and conversions, may create accuracy problems 
for instructors because it may limit cross-student comparability 
of grades. 
Changing or converting a student's grade based upon her 
performance on assignments completed after the end of the 
term during which she took the course will usually mean that 
the student has had more time to complete coursework than 
her classmates. In some classes this additional time may be 
irrelevant. In others, however, it may affect the accuracy of a 
grade. Grades within a given course should be comparable; a 
grade earned by one student should have the same meaning as 
the same grade earned by another student. The pressure to 
complete a project in a limited time, for instance, may have 
been a feature of the evaluative process for the course. If this 
is so, and if there is no other way to ensure cross-student 
comparability, it may be necessary for the instructor to 
discount work submitted after she has assigned grades, even 
though she rightly takes such work into account. Grades are 
certainly more useful to transcript readers if they can facilitate 
comparative judgments among students. 
An instructor may not remember correctly what standards 
she has employed to assess work submitted by other students. 
She may thus reasonably lack confidence that she can assess a 
37] ETHICS OF GRADING 69 
newly submitted assignment for a given course using the same 
standards she used initially to determine grades for the course. 
Thus, she may reasonably be uncertain that a changed or 
converted grade in a given course will have the same meaning 
as an identical grade assigned at the end of the term during 
which the course took place. If she is uncertain, she may 
reasonably decline to consider the newly submitted work. 
Alternatively, she may opt to discount the late work in some 
way to allow for any recall-related problems. 
Like the need for accuracy, the desire for convenience may 
rightly justify an instructor's refusal to effect a grade change or 
conversion. An instructor is certainly entitled to avoid keeping 
student-related records indefinitely (unless the records are the 
focus of a legal or institutional controversy of which she has 
reason to be aware). Concern for her convenience dictates that 
institutional policies permit her to dispose of records related to 
a student's performance in a given course after a finite-and 
reasonably short-period. If she is asked about a possible 
grade change after this period and no longer has the necessary 
records, she may not be in a position to evaluate a student's 
request for a grade change or conversion. Similarly, if she 
reasonably believes the request is frivolous, she is justified in 
declining it. 
By contrast, the PAE requires that the instructor re-
evaluate the student's grade if it is reasonable for her to believe 
that the student's request for a grade change or conversion has 
merit, if she can evaluate the records accurately, and if she can 
do so without significant inconvenience. Institutional policy 
should permit her to make a grade change or conversion at any 
time in the interests of accuracy, though it should not require 
her to disregard her reasonable concern for her own 
convenience. 
The PAE rules out institutional policies that place time 
limits on grade changes and those that stipulate that grades 
may be changed only to correct clerical errors. To be sure, 
there is doubtless a presumption in favor of stable grades. 
There is thus a reason for keeping changes unilaterally 
initiated by instructors to a minimum. In addition, an 
institutional policy limiting grade changes or conversions 
protects instructors, reducing pressure on them to consider 
excessively demanding or unreasonable student requests. 
Nonetheless, the PAE requires policies that encourage 
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accuracy. 
Fairness to transcript readers means providing them with 
updated, accurate information whenever convenient. Even if a 
grade change leads to a reduced grade, a student's expectation 
interest in retaining a grade after it has been assigned does not 
trump a transcript reader's interest in accurate information 
regarding the student's SMC. The presumption against 
instructor-initiated grade changes weighs against such changes 
when they reflect, for instance, ongoing uncertainty-dithering, 
perhaps-on an instructor's part regarding how best to 
estimate a student's SMC. The presumption does not weigh 
against a change designed to ensure that a student's grade 
more accurately reflects her SMC, provided there is significant 
reason to be confident that the new grade is more accurate. 
A rigid institutional policy that prevents an instructor from 
changing a grade after the passage of an arbitrary deadline 
does protect instructors from harassment by students. 
Nonetheless, such a policy deprives the instructor of the 
freedom to improve the accuracy of her grades. The cost of 
additional student harassment does not justify taking this 
freedom away from an educator because students and 
transcript readers both have substantial interests in accurate 
transcripts. The PAE calls for a concern with accuracy that is 
not trumped by the institutional need for closure or instructor 
convenience. And an instructor who is confident in the grades 
she has given can convey this confidence to students as clearly 
and forcefully as she can describe a rigid institutional policy, 
and so forestall inappropriate demands for grade changes. 
Some institutional policies prevent instructors from 
changing grades at all except in response to clerical errors. 
Such policies may unnecessarily limit the accuracy of grades, 
and therefore violate the PAE. A student's grade should reflect 
the instructor's best estimate of the student's SMC. There are 
a variety of ways of assessing SMC. In an individual case an 
instructor may have access to new information that she did not 
have when she computed a student's grade that leads her to 
reassess the student's SMC. She may also find herself forced to 
reassess the procedures she has chosen to use in evaluating the 
student's SMC. In either case, she should be free to change a 
grade. 
Information of at least two kinds might lead an instructor 
to reassess a student's SMC. The student might submit 
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additional work-work that should have been submitted earlier 
or work that supplements the work the student performed 
during the term in which she earned the grade at issue. Or the 
instructor might come to recontextualize the student's work as 
a result of learning about personal circumstances that affected 
the student's performance at the time she assigned the 
student's grade. 
Post-term work may or may not be relevant. Late work, if 
it is taken into account, may make the student's aggregate 
class performance look different, and the instructor may have 
good reason to alter her grade.48 Additional work, however, may 
not be relevant. Recall that a grade is not a reward for hard 
work. Doing additional work, even an infinite amount of 
additional work, does not itself warrant a higher grade. A 
grade is an estimate of SMC. Additional work justifies an 
improved grade only if it positively changes the instructor's 
assessment of the student's SMC. Giving a student a higher 
grade as a reward for extra effort violates the PAE. 
Raising a student's grade because she has completed 
additional work rightly raises questions about fairness. 
Because a grade is not a reward for effort, it is not clear what 
could justify raising a particular student's grade simply 
because she has completed extra work. Even if an instructor 
does not regard a grade change as a reward for extra work, 
however, taking additional work into account at all may seem 
to raise fairness or accuracy problems. Other students have 
been graded based on work submitted before grades were due; 
the student whose grade is being changed has not. But this is 
irrelevant to the fairness of the instructor's grade-assignment 
decision. Again, a grade is not a reward for effort, it is an 
estimate of SMC at a given point in time. Provided all grades 
submitted by the instructor reflect reasonable judgments about 
SMC, a grade change made in light of additional or substituted 
work need not be unfair. 
Suppose the instructor comes to recontextualize a student's 
work because she discovers after she has assigned grades that 
the student was in the midst of a personal crisis at the time she 
completed the work on which the instructor based her 
judgment about the student's grade. The instructor comes to 
48. Whether this is so in a given case will depend in part on the factors 
considered above in relation to late work. 
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believe that the student's work does not reflect the student's 
ability. This will not, in and of itself, be sufficient to tell her 
what the student's actual SMC is; it will simply tell her that 
she cannot trust her own estimate. Thus, recontextualization 
on its own will not warrant altering the student's grade. 
However, it may provide the instructor with a reason to provide 
the student opportunity to complete additional work designed 
to replace the work the student completed during the class in 
which she earned the grade she seeks to change. On the basis 
of this work, the instructor may be in a position to reevaluate 
the student's SMC. If she concludes, in light of this evaluation, 
that the grade she previously assigned to the student is 
inaccurate, the PAE dictates that she change it. On the other 
hand, the ability to respond to pressure may sometimes be a 
constituent of SMC. To the extent that it is, no grade change 
may be appropriate, even if the student's performance is 
recontextualized. 
An instructor may also come to conclude that some, or all, 
of her evaluative instruments, or the way she made use of the 
information derived from them, were such that she could not 
accurately assess the SMC of the students enrolled in a given 
course. She has no obligation to neurotically explore this 
possibility. Absent strong countervailing evidence, it is 
consistent with her duties under the PAE to take her own 
convenience as decisive. In some cases, though, she may 
conclude that to grade accurately, she must discount some of 
the instruments she has used to evaluate students in a given 
course or take these instruments into account differently. If, 
for instance, she gave inappropriate weight to RSEs in 
determining her grades, she may realize that in so doing she 
assigned inaccurate grades to a variety of students. In 
accordance with the PAE, she should have the freedom to 
reconsider and revise her grades, if need be. 
While the PAE requires that instructors be able to change 
or convert grades at will in the interests of accuracy, it also 
requires that transcript readers be informed of the dates on 
which grades were changed. A student may have gained more 
SMC during the period since the completion of the term when 
her initial grade was assigned. If this grade is changed, the 
student's transcript must make clear how much time has 
elapsed between the assignment of the initial grade and the 
grade change. Provided the student's transcript does make this 
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clear, however, a grade change need not raise special accuracy 
problems. 
An instructor may sometimes be required by the P AE to 
give an "I" grade if she lacks the information she needs to 
assess a student's SMC. Suppose, for instance, the student 
has turned in too few assignments for her to estimate the 
student's SMC accurately-she cannot responsibly submit a 
grade for the student. Even if she is not required to give a 
student an "1," she may have sufficient doubts about her 
understanding of the student's SMC to make acceding to the 
student's request for an "I" reasonable. Institutional policies 
should enable her to assign "I" grades, like other grades, at her 
discretion. 
Such policies should allow an instructor to convert an "I" 
she has assigned to a student into a conventional letter grade if 
she is able reasonably to assess the student's SMC. They 
should not require that the "I" become an "F" after a specified 
deadline. If they do, they clearly violate the PAE. An "F" 
grade for a course implies that the student is incompetent with 
respect to the subject matter of the course. But in the case of 
an Incomplete grade, whether a student lacks SMC is 
indeterminate. To imply that the student is subject matter 
incompetent would be inaccurate, and therefore a violation of 
the PAE. The PAE requires that the "I" designation remain on 
the student's transcript until cleared. 
The arguments against this position are, as usual, 
consequentialist or retributivist. The retributivist will wish, 
irrationally, to punish slothful students. The consequentialist 
will be concerned with motivating students to perform 
efficiently. It is good for students to be encouraged not to wait 
indefinitely to complete course requirements. These are not 
bizarre, utterly irrelevant considerations. There are genuine 
costs associated with adhering to the PAE. A student already 
taking a full load may be overwhelmed by the need to meet 
requirements for an uncompleted course from a previous term 
as well as for the courses for which she is currently registered. 
The threat of an "F" may motivate her to complete her work 
expeditiously. There is no way for this threat to be effective 
unless it is carried out when it is made. But when it is carried 
out, the instructor will be falsely declaring that she is confident 
that the student lacks SMC. A continued "I" grade, by 
contrast, will make clear that there is reason to be unsure of 
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the student's SMC without giving transcript readers any 
reason to under or overestimate it. It will also make it more 
likely that an instructor will obtain the information she needs 
to accurately to assess a student's SMC. 
Policies that result in the automatic conversion of "I"s to 
"F"s create perverse incentives for instructors. For example, if 
an instructor knows that if she does not act, a student who has 
received an "I" may receive an automatic "F," the instructor 
may be inclined to assign the student a non-failing grade so she 
will not receive an "F". However, the fact that the student has 
received an "I" implies that the instructor lacks the information 
she needs to adequately assess the student's SMC and is not 
properly able to assign a grade. The odds are good, therefore, 
that the grade she assigns will be an inaccurate measure of 
SMC. Eliminating automatic "1"-to-"F" conversion rules are 
thus desirable because they will eliminate the temptation 
towards inaccuracy. 
As noted earlier, however, it may sometimes be impossible 
for an instructor to accurately assess a student's SMC after a 
certain amount of time has passed. In this case, an "I" grade 
might simply become permanent. Because the "I" in a given 
course might reasonably be read as implying that there is still 
some possibility that a grade will be assigned for the course, it 
may be appropriate for institutions to assign a new 
"Permanently Incomplete" ("PI") grade. 
F. Academic Dishonesty 
Work that is not a student's own cannot reasonably be used 
to estimate her SMC. Thus, the PAE requires an instructor to 
give no consideration to such work in estimating a student's 
SMC. Depending on the available evidence regarding an 
academically dishonest student's SMC, the instructor may be 
warranted in treating the student's dishonesty as evidence that 
she lacks any SMC with respect to the subject matter of the 
assignment in question and is therefore warranted in giving 
her a failing grade for the assignment. The PAE offers no 
justification, however, for failing a student in a course simply 
because she has submitted work that is not her own. If, of 
course, the instructor has reasonably assigned a sufficiently 
high weight to a given assignment that incompetence with 
respect to the skills or understanding the assignment is 
designed to measure means the student lacks satisfactory SMC 
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then an "F" may be warranted. But it is warranted because the 
instructor reasonably believes the student does not have 
appropriate SMC and not because the student has been 
dishonest. 
Giving an academically dishonest student an "F" in a course 
for reasons not directly related to SMC may, of course, be 
defended on consequentialist or retributivist grounds. The 
academic consequentialist will seek to deter students from 
engaging in such behavior; the academic retributivist will seek 
to punish the student for her immoral behavior. But neither 
the consequentialist nor the retributivist tells the truth by 
giving the student an "F" when her estimated SMC does not 
warrant an "F," and the moral values both seek rightly to take 
seriously are incommensurable with SMC. 
One sort of exception to the general rule that academic 
dishonesty does not, in and of itself, justify failure may be 
available under limited circumstances. Recall that the PAE 
authorizes instructors to take their own convenience 
reasonably into account. It is unfair of a student who has 
already given an instructor reason to be suspicious of her 
honesty to expect the instructor to expend substantial extra 
time assessing the exercises she submits. An instructor cannot 
regard concern for her own convenience as justifying her in 
refusing to make a good-faith effort to estimate a student's 
SMC with respect to the subject matter of the course. But if 
such an effort is rendered significantly more difficult by the 
student's own misbehavior, she may be authorized under the 
PAE to avoid the task of assessing all of the student's work in 
order to estimate the student's SMC and the student's grade. 
Suppose the instructor knows that the student has 
submitted work not her own on more than one occasion. 
Suppose the instructor has evidence that makes it reasonable 
to believe that the student has done the same thing on other 
occasions, even though she lacks proof (in such a situation the 
instructor may not need to investigate every exercise-only a 
representative sample). Suppose, too, that she reasonably 
assumes that the student lacks SMC in many, or all, of these 
cases. And suppose that the student's presumptive lack of 
SMC in these cases means that the instructor lacks SMC with 
respect to the subject matter of the course. In this case she 
might reasonably fail the student without an across-the-board 
assessment of the student's SMC, providing she could 
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document her reasons for analyzing the situation as she does in 
a publicly defensible way.49 
The PAE does not license an instructor to withhold all 
credit for an assignment unless she reasonably believes the 
entire assignment is not the submitting student's work or 
cannot reasonably and conveniently determine which part is 
and which part is not the student's work. An assignment only 
partially a student's own work can still help an instructor to 
estimate her student's SMC. An instructor is not obligated to 
make special effort to determine which elements of an 
assignment are and are not products of the student's work, but 
if she can do so easily, she should take what the assignment 
tells her about the student's work into account when 
determining the student's grade. If not, of course, she is 
entitled to assume that none of the assignment is the student's 
work and that the student lacks SMC. 
It is certainly appropriate for an instructor to require a 
student who has submitted work not her own to complete 
substitute work. if an alternative assignment will make it 
easier for the instructor to estimate the student's SMC. An 
instructor may reasonably decline to consider additional work 
if doing so would cause her substantial inconvenience. 
The PAE offers no justification for regarding as academic 
dishonesty a student's submission of the same work in more 
than one course. There is nothing dishonest about submitting 
a paper to multiple instructors. If a student gives a paper or 
49. The appeal to convenience here and elsewhere is not an attempt to bring 
retribution in through the back door. The instructor who takes her legitimate 
convenience into account in deciding not to review all of an academically dishonest 
student's work need not be intent on causing the student purportedly compensatory 
harm for her dishonesty. The instructor's purpose may be only to reduce her own 
inconvenience; the harm to the student may be a foreseen but unintended byproduct of 
her decision to minimize her inconvenience. 
The distinction between intended harms and foreseen but unintended ones is 
central to the so-called "principle of double effect." For a careful defense of the 
distinction, see ,John R. Searle, Rationality in Action 263-66 (MIT Press 2001); on the 
principle itself, see Warren Quinn, Morality and Action 175-97 (Cambridge U. Press 
1993); Lucius Iwejuru Ug01ji, The Principle of Double Effect: A Critical Appraisal of its 
Traditional Understanding and its Modern Reinterpretation (European U. Stud. Ser. 
No. 23, Theology, Vol. 245, Peter Lang 1985); Joseph M. Boyle, Toward Understanding 
the Principle of Double Effect, 90 Ethics 527 (1980); Germain Grisez, Toward a Con-
sistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing, 15 Am. J. Juris. 64--96 (1970); and Jeffrey M. 
Ross, Proportionalism and the Principle of Double Effect (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Graduate Theological Union 1994) (on file with Graduate Theological Union Lib., 
Berkley, Cal.). 
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project to an instructor, the student represents it as her own 
work; the student should not be understood to be making any 
representation about the amount of effort invested in preparing 
it."0 While many institutions regard multiple submissions as 
academically dishonest, it is hard to defend the judgment if a 
grade is understood to serve as an accurate estimate of SMC. 
Provided a paper or project genuinely reflects a student's SMC, 
an instructor may not reasonably take it into account when 
determining a student's grade, whether or not it has been 
submitted to another instructor. A grade is not, again, a 
reward for effort, so the fact that a student who submits a 
paper or project to multiple instructors does not work as hard 
as another is irrelevant. 
An instructor might argue that she should not give credit 
for a multiply submitted paper because her grades are based on 
comparisons among student performance levels, and since 
students in general have had less time to invest in other 
projects for her class, a student who reuses a paper or project 
prepared for another class has an unfair advantage over her 
classmates. However, comparisons among classmates can 
provide only a rough basis for grades. The instructor must be 
aware of the general population of students transcript readers 
are likely to evaluate, comparing her students with them 
rather than with each other. The grade distribution for a class 
of exceptionally gifted or exceptionally untalented students 
surely ought to be quite different than the grade distribution 
for a class of normal students. Provided an instructor has an 
appropriate reference group in mind when she assigns grades, 
intra-class comparability problems are less likely to arise. 
Of course, the comparability problem also arises in a 
slightly different way. A student can obviously invest more 
time in a single paper or project submitted in multiple classes 
than she can in either of two different papers or projects. An 
instructor obviously has good reason to take this fact into 
account when using a multiply submitted paper or project to 
estimate the SMC of the student submitting it. Further, an 
instructor may wish to take into account the amount of effort a 
student has invested in the preparation of a paper or project in 
SO. This is true, at any rate, absent an instructor-specific stipulation that 
submission of a project or paper implies that it has not been submitted in fulfillment of 
any other academic requirement. It is, of course, the appropriateness of just such 
stipulations that is in question here. 
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order to compare her with her classmates. But the instructor 
can do so, not by labeling a student who submits a paper to 
multiple instructors dishonest, but simply by asking whether a 
paper has been or will be multiply submitted and giving the 
information provided by the student appropriate weight as the 
estimates of the student's SMC. 
An instructor cannot ensure intra-class comparability by 
prohibiting multiple submissions, since a student might submit 
for a given class a paper never used to fulfill a requirement for 
any other course which she had nonetheless written before the 
class began. Similarly, a student who had never received 
another instructor's formal evaluation of a paper or project 
might-and should-have drawn on the critical comments of 
others before submitting it for a class. Given that these 
practices are not in question, it would seem inconsistent to 
regard multiple submissions as inappropriate.51 
Academic dishonesty is repulsive. It ought to be 
discouraged. But it should not be discouraged through grading 
practices that are themselves dishonest and unfair and fail to 
respect the PAE's requirement that grades reflect SMC as 
accurately as possible. 
G. Extra Credit 
In accordance with the PAE, an instructor ordinarily has no 
reason to give extra credit work. If her evaluative instruments 
are adequate, then she does not need further exercises to 
determine students' SMC. And because a grade is not a 
reward for student effort or work, but an estimate of SMC, the 
mere fact that a student has done additional work is no reason 
for her to receive a better grade than she would otherwise have 
earned. Indeed, allowing a grade to be influenced by extra 
credit can result in grade inflation that makes the grade 
significantly less accurate and less useful to transcript readers. 
51. An objector could, of course, argue that these practices, too, should be 
prohibited. But ruling out the solicitation of critical feedback on written work from 
peers and other instructors would mean eliminating a valuable part of the learning 
process: students often learn as much from informal conversations as they do from 
formal lectures and providing commentary can be as useful educationally as receiving 
it. Prohibiting the submission of written work completed before a course but not 
submitted for any other seems arbitrary and appears to punish the creativity and 
penchant for independent thought evinced when a student completes serious academic 
work on her own 
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Only if an exercise is unnecessary to the accurate assessment 
of a student's SMC, but nonetheless provides information that 
makes an instructor's positive evaluation of her SMC more 
accurate, is awarding extra credit for its completion 
. 52 
appropnate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The P AE calls for instructors to grade with the goal of 
telling the truth to potential transcript readers and to take 
seriously the incommensurability between SMC and other 
characteristics of students that become apparent in the course 
of teaching and evaluating them. In accordance with the PAE, 
an instructor should decline to take a student's attendance into 
account when determining her grade-though she may 
consider what the student says when participating in class 
discussions as a source of information about the student's SMC. 
She should not base her grades on activities that do not yield 
outcomes she can use to estimate student performance, and she 
should give more weight to examinations and papers than to 
RSEs, ideally not taking RSEs into account at all when 
determining grades. She may reasonably consider a student's 
reflections on service-learning experiences when she estimates 
the student's SMC, but she may not base a grade simply on the 
student's participation in service-learning activities. She 
should, in general, avoid allowing the time a student's work is 
submitted to affect the student's grade. She should be free to 
make grade changes and replace "Incomplete" ("I") grades with 
letter grades at any time if doing so will help ensure that the 
grades given more accurately reflect her students' SMC. And 
while she should refuse to consider work that is not a student's 
own in determining the student's grade, she should not use a 
grade as a means of expressing moral disapproval of a 
student's dishonesty or as a means of encouraging student 
52. This judr,rment at least raises questions about Schrag's proposal that 
instructors should allow "students to earn extra credit by choosing to expend additional 
effort on work that meets some minimal level of quality." Schrag, supra n. 20, at 71. 
Increasing grades in response to student effort will often be deceptive and involve 
attempts to commensurate the incommensurable. As Schrag observes, until 
transcripts reflect effort or other factors in addition to SMC, "the egalitarian instructor 
must decide whether to give priority to supporting egalitarian justice or to avoiding 
deception." Id. at 73. Of course, extra work may sometimes signal that additional 
SMC has been acquired; if it does, a higher grade would obviously be appropriate. 
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honesty. 
Many instructors currently do things that violate the PAE. 
I suggest that this reflects their probable acceptance of two 
possible theoretical accounts of the logic of grading: academic 
consequentialism and academic retributivism. Neither of these 
approaches is plausible. Consequentialism is unworkable and 
incoherent; in addition, academic consequentialism leads to 
results which most academics are likely to regard as counter-
intuitive. Retributivism appears plausible only because of an 
illegitimate transplantation of economic modes of thought into 
non-economic realms of life. And academic retributivism 
violates the PAE's incommensurability requirement since it 
attempts to make grades into expressions of moral judgment, 
despite the fact that moral worth is incommensurable with 
SMC. 
Endorsing the PAE does not mean that the concerns that 
lead many instructors to violate it are illegitimate. It is 
important to motivate student behavior, to restrain dishonesty, 
and to reduce inconvenience. But it is also important not to do 
so at the expense of accuracy and fairness. Thus, in particular, 
the PAE is perfectly compatible with a strategy for student 
evaluation that involves retaining grades as measures of SMC 
while also involving the assessment of students' effort and 
character. It would be possible to note that a student was 
intelligent but lazy or hardworking but a slow learner. It 
would be possible to indicate that the student performed well 
on examinations but wrote less satisfactory papers, or vice 
versa. It would be possible to report that a student was 
academically gifted but personally immature and insensitive, 
inclined to making cutting remarks to others in class. Nothing 
prevents an institution from attaching to a student's transcript 
a notation highlighting a student's hard work in a given course, 
making a transcript reader aware that she suffered from 
exceptional personal stresses during a given term, or indicating 
that she was academically dishonest when preparing work for a 
particular course. 51 Providing such information separately 
51. See Cahn, supra n. 22, at 107 n. 4; see also Schrag, supra n. 20, at 72 
("fG]rades that do count effort convey misleading messages to third parties and are 
reprehensible on that account from the ethical point of view. My proposal to solve this 
problem cannot be adopted by the individual professor but requires institutional action, 
making the effort-based policy more transparent. For example, the transcript could 
indicate by an asterisk any grade earned by producing additional work not required of 
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would be more useful to transcript readers than attempting to 
make grades communicate diverse and incommensurable sorts 
of information.52 And it would remove the pressure on 
instructors to craft arbitrary ways of commensurating 
incommensurable factors when determining students' grades. 
Respecting the P AE is also consistent with instructors' 
legitimate self-concern; an instructor can adhere to the PAE 
without inconveniencing herself excessively to accommodate 
students who have been irresponsible. While an instructor 
ought not to mislead transcript readers, she is not obligated to 
do anything and everything possible to determine the truth. 
Provided she does not use inaction for the sake of convenience 
as an excuse to punish students for morally problematic 
behavior, the instructor is certainly free to take her own 
convenience into account when determining when extra effort 
is and is not appropriate. 
The P AE challenges instructors and institutions to take 
accuracy seriously. It challenges instructors to grade students 
in ways that will be most useful to transcript readers, and thus 
most fair to students. It challenges instructors and institutions 
to respect the differences between academic and nonacademic 
factors. It therefore calls on them to exhibit in their grading 
policies and practices the commitment to truth and fairness 
that is at the heart of the academic enterprise. It therefore 
provides useful guidance for institutional decision-makers. In 
the limited number of cases in which courts appropriately 
address grade-related issues, it may help them to think more 
clearly about instructors' and institutions' policies and 
practices. Of course, courts will not typically be situated 
appropriately to second-guess instructors' and institutions' 
grading decisions. When they decide to review such decisions, 
however, the PAE may provide them with a useful basis for 
evaluating the accuracy and fairness of judgments about 
grades. 
all students."). 
52. It might even have a greater deterrent effect on irresponsible students. An 
academic dishonesty notation on a student's transcript may be far more threatening to 
her academic or professional future than a low grade. The proponent of the PAE can 
welcome this deterrent effect even though she does not regard deterrence as itself an 
appropriate basis for assigning grades. 
